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Abstract
Using a large panel of mainly unquoted euro-area rms over the period 2003-11, this
paper examines the impact of nancial pressure on rmsemployment. The analysis
nds evidence that nancial pressure negatively a¤ects rmsemployment decisions.
This e¤ect is stronger during the euro area-crisis (2010-11), especially for rms in
the periphery compared to their counterparts in non-periphery European economies.
When we introduce rm-level heterogeneity, we show that nancial pressure appears
to be both statistically and quantitatively more important for bank-dependent, small
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rms operating in periphery economies during the crisis.
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1 Introduction
The magnitude of the global nancial crisis that commenced in late 2007 was exceptional
when compared to previous episodes of nancial distress. At its core, it was a banking crisis
highlighting the important links between nancial conditions and the real economy (Iyer
et al., 2014). In the euro area, following a period of convergence prior to the crisis, nancial
market fragmentation intensied and periphery-based rms, especially smaller ones, faced
major problems in accessing external nance.1 Early 2010 witnessed the transformation of
the global nancial crisis into a sovereign debt crisis in the euro area.2 The crisis originated
in Greece but gradually spread to other periphery economies. With their government bond
yields soaring, and following a series of credit rating downgrades, Greece, Ireland and Portu-
gal were forced in 20102011 to resort to bailout schemes organised by the European Union,
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, in the
second half of 2011, Spanish and Italian government bonds came under signicant market
pressure. Given the important connection between sovereign and banking sector credit-
worthiness (Acharya and Ste¤en, 2015), banks in the euro-area periphery faced severe stress
levels and responded by shedding assets.3 In Europe, nancial pressure, as measured by the
ratio of corporate interest payments relative to cash ow, rose as the global nancial crisis
began in 2008, and remained at high levels until 2012 (Benito, 2017). This suggests that
nancial pressure was particularly severe during the global nancial crisis, and the ensuing
sovereign debt crisis reected elevated interest rate expenses.
The present paper aims to provide new evidence on how employment responds to nance
1ECB policymakers frequently highlighted the negative e¤ects of nancial fragmentation. The rise in euro-
area nancial fragmentation along core and periphery lines is well-documented in the existing literature. See,
for instance, Mayordomo et al. (2015) for evidence on interbank money markets, and Rughoo and Sarantis
(2014) for retail banking deposit and lending rates.
2Several studies highlight the role of the banking risk in transforming the global nancial crisis into the
sovereign debt crisis, and the nexus between banking risk and sovereign risk. See, among others, Alter and
Schüler (2012), De Bruyckere et al. (2013), Acharya et al. (2014), Delatte et al. (2017) and Afonso et al.
(2018).
3As Acharya and Ste¤en (2015) highlight, in 2011 only, European banks on average lost 40% of their
market value and shed billions of euros in assets in order to raise regulatory capital ratios.
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pressure, focusing on the euro-area. More specically, we investigate the following new
questions. Has rmsemployment reacted to nancial pressure during the recent European
sovereign debt crisis? Has nancial pressure had di¤ering e¤ects on rms operating in
periphery euro-area economies (such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland) compared to their
counterparts in the core euro-area economies? Is the link between employment decisions and
nancial pressure more potent for nancially constrained rms compared to unconstrained
rms? To answer the above questions, we capture the e¤ect of nancial pressure using a
rm-specic interest rate variable, the so-called interest burden. There is evidence suggesting
that employment, as well as other company decisions, such as investment and dividend
payments, are sensitive to nancial pressure (see Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito, 2005;
Benito and Young, 2007; Benito and Hernando, 2008). Yet these studies do not extend to
the recent sovereign debt crisis, and use single-country datasets, which makes it di¢ cult to
draw conclusions about the euro area as a whole, or to obtain crisp comparisons on the
experience of periphery versus non-periphery countries.
Our study is motivated by the recent developments in the euro area, but there is also
theoretical rationale for expecting an e¤ect of nancial pressure on employment. Firms
typically require some external nance, from either banks or nancial markets, to pursue
investment projects, and this is available subject to minimum standards of creditworthiness
in the eyes of the lender. Theoretical models, reviewed in Section 2, suggest that the cost and
availability of external nance can a¤ect rm-level employment through several channels.4
As Vermeulen (2002) notes, the e¤ects of nancial constraints are more likely to a¤ect small
rms than large rms and indeed rms that are weaker on other criteria c.f. Bougheas et al.
4Recent studies using structural models show that there is a strong link between nancial frictions and
labour market performance. For instance, Mumtaz and Zanetti (2015) provide evidence that shocks to
technology and the job separation rate are key factors in explaining adjustment costs. Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) nd that nancial shocks a¤ect US rmscapacity to borrow, as rmsnancial conditions to borrow
tightened during 2008. Similarly, Mumtaz and Zanetti (2016) show that the link between nancial frictions
and the labour market becomes more potent for monetary policy, technology and entrepreneurial wealth
shocks. Finally, Zanetti (2017) demonstrates that nancial shocks lead to considerable e¤ects on debt and
wages, while shocks to the job destruction rate have an important role in explaining changes in unemployment
levels.
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(2006) and Buc¼a and Vermeulen (2017).
We provide ve main contributions to the existing literature. First, we investigate
whether the link between nancial pressure and employment was more prominent during
the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2011. Considering the evidence that higher levels of in-
terest payments negatively a¤ect xed investment, employment and other decisions at the
rm-level prior to the crisis, we investigate this relationship after the large credit tightening
generated by the joint bank and sovereign crisis that hit the EU between 2010 and 2012.
Second, we examine whether the impact of nancial pressure on employment is more
pronounced in the periphery of the euro area. In doing so, we allow for the fact that di¤erent
type of businesses, mainly smaller and less-diversied businesses that are more dependent
on bank nancing operate in periphery economies.
Third, we account for the role of rm-level heterogeneity in examining the impact of
nancial pressure on rmsemployment by distinguishing between more and less nancially
constrained rms. Following the seminal work of Fazzari et al. (1988), several pre-crisis
studies have highlighted the importance of nancial constraints on rms real behaviour
such as xed investment, inventory investment and R&D (see Hubbard, 1998, for a survey).
A number of recent studies have re-examined the impact of nancial factors on investment,
commonly identifying a strong e¤ect for nancially constrained rms, especially in the US
(Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010). Focusing on nancially constrained companies
allows us therefore to provide a sharper analysis of the e¤ects of recent nancial crisis on
employment than previously done in the literature.
Fourth, we employ a much broader sample of rms than other studies. Our data-set is
made up mainly of unlisted companies. A negative shock to nancial pressure is expected to
profoundly a¤ect Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) which are more vulnerable due to
their strong dependence on bank nance. This has important economic implications, since
the weight of smaller rms in the European economy is considerable, with SMEs contributing
around 60% of the value added and 70% of employment (Artola and Genre, 2011). The
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president of the ECB (Draghi, 2014) highlighted the negative e¤ects of fragmentation in euro-
area credit market conditions, pointing out that SMEs in periphery countries faced especially
strong supply constraints, with credit weakness contributing to economic weakness.5
Finally, in a robustness test we match our rm-level data with a syndicated loan database
to construct an alternative debt-servicing burden. Acharya et al. (2018) show that the bank
lending contraction during the Sovereign debt crisis led to signicant and real e¤ects of
the borrowing of rms in Europe. Hence, the matched database allow us to strengthen our
identication and to control for credit demand and productivity shocks (Berton et al., 2018).
Previewing our main results, we nd evidence that the interest burden has a negative and
signicant e¤ect on rmsemployment. The e¤ect is stronger during the 2010-2011 crisis
period. Moreover, the e¤ect is more potent for rms that operate in periphery economies
and nancially constrained rms. Our ndings are robust to several sensitivity checks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of
the related literature. Sections 3 and 4 contain our methodology and data-set description,
respectively. Section 5 presents the empirical results, while Section 6 explains the robustness
checks undertaken. Section 7 provides conclusions and policy implications.
2 Economic background
The pathbreaking empirical work of Fazzari et al. (1988) suggests that corporate nancial
decisions are a¤ected by constraints arising from the availability and cost of external nance
to rms, and di¤er according to the observable characteristics used by lenders to determine
their creditworthiness. The degree of nancial constraints faced by rms is a critical de-
terminant of real responses to nancial market imperfections. For instance, Byoun and Xu
5Draghis argument is supported by several recent studies that examine the impact of the euro area
sovereign debt crisis on the availability of credit for SMEs. For example, Ferrando et al. (2015) nd that
during the sovereign debt crisis SMEs in stressed countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) were
more likely to be credit rationed, both in quantity and in price dimension. Coeuré (2013) points out that
during 2010-2011 SMEs in countries where sovereign debt was under market pressure had on average a 20%
higher chance of being credit constrained than their German counterparts.
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(2015) nd that during the recent nancial crisis, rms that depend more on external -
nance became more vulnerable, decreasing their level of investment.6 Buc¼a and Vermeulen
(2017) show that following a credit tightening bank-dependent rms reduce investment more
compared to their counterparts.
The literature on the relationship between nancial constraints and employment is not as
voluminous as that on investment, but the general consensus that emerges is that nancial
constraints can play an important role in rm-level employment decisions. As Benmelech
et al. (2011) point out, theoretically, the cost and availability of external nance may af-
fect rm-level employment both directly and indirectly through a number of channels. A
direct e¤ect can arise in the presence of a mismatch between labour payments and cash ow
generation that induces rms to nance labour activity throughout production. Hence, a
negative shock in the capacity to nance working capital should lead to lower employment.7
An indirect e¤ect can arise through investment.
Capital market imperfections imply that internal fundsavailability places constraints
on investment, and given labour-capital complementarity, employment should decline in
line with the fall in capital. In the theoretical work of Arnold (2002), the combination of
uncertain prots and xed future debt payments implies that rms face the risk of nancial
distress. His model implies that rmslabour demand uctuates in response to changes in
their balance-sheet position, with a weaker nancial position being associated with lower
demand due to a higher risk of future nancial distress.
The previous empirical studies that are most closely related to our analysis are Nickell
and Nicolitsas (1999) and Benito and Hernando (2008). Both papers provide evidence of a
signicantly negative relationship between employment and nancial pressure within single-
6It has been argued that the high prevalence of SMEs in periphery European economies rendered them
vulnerable to the tightening of credit during the nancial crisis and is crucial for the slow pace of economic
recovery (Klein, 2014).
7Chodorow-Reich (2014) also argues that for rms that use working capital to nance labour or other
production inputs, an increase in the interest cost of borrowing operates like a cost-push shock implying
lower output and labour demand. At the limit, rms may give up working capital and nance production
out of retained earnings only, or may be subject to credit rationing.
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country rm-level panels focusing on the ratio of interest payments to cash ow, the interest
burden, as the key nancial variable. As Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) point out, interest
burden is a ow measure of nancial pressure capturing the premium on borrowing costs or
the probability of credit being completely rationed. Finally, they show that the sensitivity of
employment to the interest burden is greater in the case of xed-term employment contracts
(Benito and Hernando, 2008) and for rms that are under greater long-term nancial pressure
(Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999).8
More recent studies that examine the rm-level impact of the nancial crisis typically con-
sider the US and nd that nancially constrained rms were hit the hardest (see Campello
et al., 2010).9 Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) nd that US workers in small rms in indus-
tries with high external nancing needs were more likely to become unemployed during the
2007-2009 crisis. They view these ndings as being supportive of the credit constraints
hypothesis, according to which smaller rms are highly reliant on bank nancing; hence,
disruptions in the ow of bank lending are expected to have important real economic e¤ects
primarily through smaller rms. Chodorow-Reich (2014) constructs a data-set that incor-
porates information on banking relationships and employment for non-nancial US rms
during 2008-2009. His results indicate an important interplay between lender health and
rm-level employment behaviour, as well as a role for nancial frictions related to asymmet-
ric information in the lending market.
There is also evidence suggesting that bank-lending shocks exert an impact on European
rmsreal decisions. Focusing on the 2007-09 crisis, Bentolila et al. (2017) nd that Spanish
rms associated with weaker banks decreased their level of employment. Cingano et al.
(2016) and Popov and Rocholl (2016) provide similar evidence for Italian and German rms,
8Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) employ three measures of long-term nancial constraints using a sample
of quoted rms: size (number of employees), dividend payout relative to assets, and debt to capital ratio.
The rms are overall fairly large (the average number of employees is 4,574). High-debt rms exhibit a
signicantly stronger employment response to the interest burden, while the di¤erence is insignicant in the
case of size and dividend payout classication schemes.
9Campello et al. (2010) use data on ex ante investment decisions based on surveys of CFOs and nd that
credit availability had strong e¤ects on rmsspending plans, with constrained rms planning deeper cuts
in employment, technology and capital spending.
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respectively. In particular, the ndings of the former study show that credit shocks have
reduced rmsvalue added, employment and intermediate inputs purchases. The latter study
demonstrates that less-healthy banks led rms to decrease their employment and wage levels.
Dwenger et al. (2018) document that rm-bank relationships in Germany have su¤ered from
banks losses from trading activities. This led to a reduction in rm-level decisions (i.e.,
investment and employment). A handfull of studies investigate the e¤ect of the European
sovereign debt crisis on rmscorporate policies. For instance, Acharya et al. (2018) nd
that rms which experience higher (lower) bank dependence on periphery banks are more
(less) nancially constrained, and as a result they face a decrease (increase) in investment,
employment and sales. Using rm-bank data from Italy, Bottero et al. (2015) document that
the sovereign shock transmitted was transmitted through the lending channel and has had
a negative e¤ect on small rms, as they cut their investments disproportionally more than
larger ones. Finally, Balduzzi et al. (2017) explore the e¤ect of the European crisis on Italian
rms and conclude that increases (decreases) in banksCDS spreads (equity valuations) led
to a fall in investment and employment for younger and smaller rms.
3 Empirical specications and methodology
3.1 Baseline-specication
To examine the sensitivity of rmsemployment decisions to nancial pressure we estimate
a quadratic adjustment cost employment model that has been augmented to account for
nancial factors. This model has also been employed by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and
Benito and Hernando (2008).
nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2IBit 1 + 3wit + 4it + 5wit 1 + 6kit + it (3.1)
where i = 1,2,. . . , N indexes rms and t = 1,2,. . . , T indexes years. n is the log of the
number of employees. w is the log of the real wage at the rm, while w represents its
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growth rate. k is the log of the capital stock normalised on the price of investment goods. 
is the growth of real sales, capturing demand shocks.10
The interest burden (IB) is the key explanatory variable for our analysis, accounting for
the role of nancial pressure on employment. Following Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and
Benito and Hernando (2008), this variable is measured as the ratio of interest payments to
cash ow. The aim of this variable is to capture the increase in interest rates that a rm
pays out of its loans due to bankscredit tightening. This is thought to be an e¢ cient index
since it directly captures the impact of interest rate changes on rmsnancial position.
There is a large and growing literature that explores the impact of interest burden on several
rmsreal decisions. For example, Benito and Whitley (2003) demonstrate that the average
interest rate on nancial debt in the UK has a negative e¤ect on rmsnancial health. Chen
and Guariglia (2009) nd a signicant inverse relation between the level of employment of
Chinese rms and the level of interest burden, coverage and borrowing ratio. Spaliara (2009)
provides evidence of a direct e¤ect of rm-specic interest rate on the capital-labour ratio.
Recently, Guariglia et al. (2016) show that the ratio of interest payments to total debt a¤ects
UK rmschances of survival. It is expected that an increase in rmsinterest burden should
lead to lower levels of employment.
The error term it comprises a rm-specic time-invariant component, encompassing
all time-invariant rm characteristics likely to inuence employment, as well as the time-
invariant component of the measurement error a¤ecting any of the regression variables; a
time-specic component accounting for possible business cycle e¤ects; and an idiosyncratic
component.11
We control for the rm-specic time-invariant component of the error term by estimat-
ing our equation in rst-di¤erences, and for the time-specic component by including time
dummies (in addition to the time dummies interacted with industry dummies) in all our spec-
10See Table A1 in the appendix for the denitions of the variables in our data-set.
11All tables report the m1 test for rst-order serial correlation of the di¤erenced residuals. In most cases
the absence of second-order serial correlation under the m2 test is rejected, suggesting that the error term
in the empirical specication displays rst-order serial correlation.
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ications (see Brown et al., 2009). We also add country dummies to control for institutional
di¤erences between countries.
3.2 The e¤ect of the euro-area crisis
The chronology of the euro-area sovereign debt crisis is well documented in previous studies
(e.g. Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). It is commonly accepted that the most severe phase
of the crisis occurred during 2010-2011. The crisis period includes developments such as
soaring government bond yields in the periphery of the euro area, downgrades by credit rating
agencies, and the initiation of a systemic response through bailouts, the purchase of distressed
bonds by the ECB within the Securities Markets Programme and the commencement of the
three-year Long-Term Renancing Operations at the end of 2011. By 2012, the worst was
over, with bond yields declining, especially after Mario Draghis announcement in July of
that year that the ECB was ready to do whatever it took to preserve the euro.
In order to investigate whether, controlling for other factors, the response of employment
to interest burden is di¤erent during the euro-area sovereign debt crisis period, Equation
(3.1) is augmented with a crisis dummy variable (Crisist), which takes a value of one over
the period 2010-2011, and zero otherwise.
nit= 1 + 1nit 1 + 2IBit 1Crisist + 3IBit 1(1  Crisist)+ (3.2)
+4wit+5it + 6wit 1 + 7kit + it
In the presence of a structural change, the e¤ect of interest burden on employment during
crisis (2) and non-crisis years (3) should be signicantly di¤erent. In fact, we would expect
changes in the interest burden to exert a stronger impact on rmsemployment as the crisis
period deepened (j2j > j3j).12
12Instead of estimating the models for di¤erent sub-samples (i.e. crisis vs non-crisis), we interact the
interest burden variable in all our specications with dummy variables indicating di¤erent time periods or
groups of rms. This approach allows us to avoid problems of endogenous sample selection; gain degrees of
freedom; and take into consideration the fact that rms can transit between groups.
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3.3 Non-periphery versus periphery economies
The periphery of the euro area faced signicant credit constraints during the sovereign debt
crisis. As we see in Figures 1 and 2, both the pricing and the quantity of lending deteri-
orated in periphery countries over 2010-2011. Motivated by these developments, we next
explore the extent to which, controlling for the e¤ect of the crisis, changes in debt servicing
costs a¤ect rmsemployment disproportionately in periphery versus non-periphery euro-
area economies. We argue that rms that operate in the periphery group are likely to be
more responsive to the interest burden during the sovereign debt crisis given the tighter
credit conditions and limited access to external nance that they faced.
To test this hypothesis, we further augment the model in Equation (3.2) with interactive
terms related to the periphery dummy Peripheryi, which is equal to one if the rm is
operating in periphery economies (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and zero otherwise.
This classication scheme is fairly standard in the literature on European economics. For
instance, Bris et al. (2008) classify Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal as the weak euro area
members on the basis of their currency performance versus the German Mark in the pre-euro
period. Moreover, Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) consider the aforementioned economies
as the periphery countries experienced signicant deterioration in the value of fundamentals
crucial for ensuring long-term EMU membership since the introduction of the euro in 1999.13
nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2IBit 1  Crisist  Peripheryi + 3IBit 1  (1  Crisist)  Peripheryi+
+ 4IBit 1  Crisist  (1  Peripheryi) + 5IBit 1  (1  Crisist)  (1  Peripheryi)+
+ 6wit 1 + 7wit + 8kit ++9it + it (3.3)
If the coe¢ cient of the periphery dummy interacted term during the crisis dominates the
corresponding term outside it (j2j > j3j), then an additional response of employment to
13Other studies that adopt similar classication methodology include Afonso et al. (2014). Finally, Greece
would have been a legitimate candidate for the periphery group, but due to missing data on wages it was
dropped from the analysis. This is a common procedure in the literature, i.e., rms that do not have complete
records on the main variables of interest are dropped from the data-set (see Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008).
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interest burden for periphery economies during the crisis is detectable compared to more
tranquil years.
3.4 Firm-level heterogeneity
Finally, we take into account the impact of rm-level heterogeneity on the relationship be-
tween employment and nancial pressure. In order to ensure robustness, we focus on three
dimensions of rm heterogeneity: bank dependence, size and rms legal status. Bank-
dependent rms rely heavily on bank nance and have limited access to long-term debt. As
banks signicantly cut credit to rms during the crisis, we expect that more bank-dependent
rms su¤ered more (see Santos, 2011; Byrne et al., 2016). Similarly, smaller rms are associ-
ated with higher levels of information asymmetry (Spaliara, 2009). Thus, they are likely to
su¤er more from capital markets imperfections than their larger counterparts. On the other
hand, private rms have more di¢ culties in accessing external nance and rely more on their
own internal nance compared with their public counterparts (Gao et al., 2013). If access
to external funds is limited, these rms are more constrained in their ability to respond to
changes in the nancial conditions than public rms.
The splitting criteria are based on rmsquantitative and qualitative information. In
keeping with standard practice in the literature, we use the median of the distribution of
bank dependence and size measures as a cut-o¤ point to classify rms into more and less
bank-dependent, as well as small and large. The classication takes place each year; hence,
we allow rms to transit between classes. Regarding the information on legal status, we sort
rms into private and public. To sum up, the resulting dummy variable Dummyit is equal
to one if the rm is classied as bank dependent/small/private within each industry at year
t and zero otherwise. The econometric model is as follows.
11
nit = 1 + 1nit 1 + 2IBit 1  Crisist Dummyit + 3IBit 1  (1  Crisist) Dummyit+
+ 4IBit 1  Crisist  (1 Dummyit) + 5IBit 1  (1  Crisist)  (1 Dummyit)+
+ 6wit 1 + 7wit + 8kit + 9it + it (3.4)
This specication captures the impact of rm-level heterogeneity on the response of
employment to the interest burden during crisis and non-crisis periods. We would expect
changes in the interest burden to exert a stronger impact on employment in the case of
bank-dependent/small/private rms, especially in the crisis period (j2j > j3j).
3.5 Estimation methodology
We estimate our models with a system-Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). This esti-
mator combines in a system the relevant equation in rst di¤erences and in levels (Arellano
and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The system-GMM estimator is preferred to the
simple rst-di¤erence GMM estimator when instruments are likely to be weak (Blundell and
Bond, 1998).
In our specication models, we control for the possibility of endogeneity of the regres-
sors. To instrument the interest burden, we consider euro-area monetary policy shocks,
which by construction, are exogenous to economic developments, while at the same time are
expected to a¤ect rm borrowing costs. Specically, we use quarterly data over 1999-2016
and estimate a Taylor rule type of specication, where the policy rate of the ECB (main
renancing operations rate) is regressed on a constant, its lag, euro-area ination and euro
area output gap. The latter is measured using deviations of actual output (euro-area real
GDP) from the Hodrick-Prescott trend. The residuals from these regressions, aggregated
to annual frequency through summation, provide estimates of the monetary policy shocks.
In a recent study, Paligorova and Santos (2017) use a similar residuals-based approach to
measure monetary policy shocks. They are less likely to be driven by changes in economic
12
conditions and are therefore cleaner instruments for the interest burden. For all other
rm-specic variables, we rely on values of the regressors lagged four or more as instruments
in the di¤erenced equation, and of di¤erences of the regressors lagged three times or more
in the levels equation.14
To evaluate whether our instruments are legitimate and our model correctly specied, we
use the Sargan test (also known as J test), which is a test for over-identifying restrictions,
and the test for nth-order serial correlation in the di¤erenced of the residuals using the m(n)
test. Under the null of instrument validity, the former test is asymptotically distributed as
a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number
of parameters. Where the number of over-identifying restrictions is large, the Sargan test
may have less power to reject the null hypothesis (Blundell and Bond, 2000). Hence, we also
report the di¤erence-in-Sargan test, which examines the validity of the additional moment
conditions imposed in the levels equation by the system-GMM estimator under the null of
instrument validity.
The system GMM is consistent if there is no third order serial correlation in the error
term of the rst di¤erenced equation. We note that the Sargan test is sometimes relatively
weak in large samples. Specically, Blundell et al. (2001) demonstrate using Monte Carlo
experiments that this test tends to over-reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments for
the system-GMM, especially for large samples. Chen and Guariglia (2013) conrm this
nding using a large panel of Chinese rms. The m(n) test is asymptotically distributed
as a standard normal under the null of no n-th order serial correlation of the di¤erenced
residuals.15
14In all specication models we use the full set of collapsed instruments to improve the e¢ ciency of our
results (see Roodman, 2009). Moreover, it is generally accepted that lagged variables (which are often referred
to as internalinstruments) are distributed independently of the error process and that they are su¢ ciently
correlated with the included endogenous regressors. Hence they are frequently used as instruments in the
literature. See for example Almeida et al. (2010) who show that IV estimators that make use of internal
instruments are very e¤ective in controlling for measurement error in the regressors.
15If there is evidence of serial correlation of order 2 in the di¤erenced residuals, the instrument set needs
to be restricted to lags 3 and deeper. The latter instruments are valid in the absence of serial correlation of
order three in the di¤erenced residuals (Roodman, 2007; Brown et al., 2009). Note that neither the Sargan
test nor the test for n-th order serial correlation in the di¤erenced residuals allows for discrimination between
13
Finally, we present two statistics to test for under-identication (Kleibergen and Paap,
2006) and weak instruments (Cragg and Donald, 1993). As in Bazzi and Clemens (2013), we
do not rely on the individual rst-stage GMM regressions; rather, we employ the Kleibergen-
Paap and the Cragg-Donald matrix versions of the Wald statistic to test whether the instru-
ments jointly explain enough variation in the multiple endogenous regressors.16
4 Data
4.1 Data description
The data-set is drawn from the annual accounting reports taken from the 2012 version of
the AMADEUS (Analyse Major Database from European Sources) database, distributed by
Bureau Van Dijk (BvDEP). The database comprises nancial information in standardised
nancial format for 19 million public and private rms across European countries. The local
source for these data is generally the o¢ ce of the Registrar of Companies. We cover the time
period 2003 through 2011.17 Our data-set spans the following eleven European countries
that belong in the euro area: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The database is made up not only of
listed rms but, more importantly, also covers unlisted companies. In fact, approximately
70% of the rms, included in our data-set, are not listed on the stock market.
To ensure comparability with previous studies, we set a number of restrictions on the
dataset. First, we consider only rms that have unconsolidated accounts.18 This lter-
ing process ensures comparability across our sample as not all European countries require
poor instruments and model specication.
16Following Zhang et al. (2009), Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) and Chen et al. (2017),
we report the corresponding tests in the Tables of results.
17A maximum of ten years of complete data history can be downloaded at once. Our data-set was
downloaded in 2012, allowing us to have information for nine years, since year 2012 was poorly reported at
that time.
18The majority of the rms in the AMADEUS report unconsolidated statements, while consolidated state-
ments are provided when available.
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consolidation of accounts for all rms.19 Using unconsolidated statements also avoids double-
counting rms, ensuring that the majority of the rms in the data-set are relatively small.20
Second, following standard selection criteria in the literature, observations with negative
sales and assets are dropped to eliminate observations when there are inputting mistakes.
In order to control for the potential inuence of outliers, observations in the one percent
tail for each of the regression variables are also excluded. This is aimed at removing any
extraordinary rm shocks or coding errors. In addition, rms with less than three years of
consecutive observations are also dropped from the sample to minimise potential selection
bias.21 By allowing for entry and exit of rms the use of an unbalanced panel partially
mitigates potential selection and survivorship bias. The nal panel covers 150,268 rms
(corresponding to 1,048,028 observations) which operate in the manufacturing sector.22
5 Results
5.1 Interest burden and the role of the crisis
We begin our enquiry by estimating a baseline model without interaction terms, which cor-
responds to Equation (3.1). This model is aimed at assessing the direct e¤ect of interest
burden on rmsemployment. Next, we augment the baseline model with interactions be-
tween the interest burden and the nancial crisis period, as shown in Equation (3.2). Our
19Limited coverage of nancial information may still occur in AMADEUS as the degree of rmsaccounts
ling and publication requirements are di¤erent across countries. For instance, in Germany many rms
decide not to le detailed annual reports preferring to pay a non-reporting fee (Ferrando et al., 2014).
20In our paper, we are unable to make a distinction between the proportion of interest payments which
refer to existing and new debt, due to data constraints. Specically, there is no clear distinction in the
available data between interest rates on new and existing loans (see Bell and Young, 2010, who make a
similar point).
21Table A2 in the appendix reports summary statistics for the variables used in the estimations. Also, see
Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix for the structure of the panel.
22Following Blundell et al. (1992) and based on a two-digit NACE classication, rms are allocated to
one of the following nine industrial sectors: metal and metal goods; other minerals and mineral products;
chemical and man-made bres; mechanical engineering; electrical and instrument engineering; motor vehicles
and parts; other transport equipment; food, drink and tobacco; textiles, clothing, leather and footwear; and
others.
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goal is to assess the di¤erential impact of the 20102011 crisis on European rmsemploy-
ment decisions. The results of the regressions are reported in Table 1 in successive columns.
The evidence points to a strong direct e¤ect of interest burden on employment, as shown
in Column 1. This suggests that among euro-area rms there are signicant e¤ects from -
nancial pressure on employment, consistent with the interpretation of Benito and Hernando
(2008) that nancing constraints a¤ect labour demand. In addition, we nd that the impact
of the interest burden is larger during the European sovereign debt crisis (see Column 2).
This nding reinforces the idea that during the crisis, nancial pressure is more important
in determining rmsemployment.23
The above ndings are not only statistically but also economically important. Specically,
the coe¢ cient of -0.146 implies an elasticity of employment with respect to interest burden,
evaluated at sample means of -0.031. A ten percent increase in interest burden leads therefore
to a 0.31 percent reduction in employment. With respect to the model with interaction
terms, taking the point estimate at face value, our estimation suggests that the elasticity
of employment with respect to interest burden is -0.023 for the crisis period. Thus, a ten
percent increase in interest burden during the crisis period implies a 0.23 percent decline in
employment.
Turning to the coe¢ cients on the control variables, we note that they attain the expected
signs and are mostly statistically signicant. Specically, wage w and growth in wage w
exert a negative and highly signicant e¤ect on rmsemployment. In addition, growth in
sales  and capital stock k have a positive and signicant impact on employment.
Finally, the diagnostic tests do not generally indicate problems with the choice of instru-
ments and the specication of our model. The Sargan tests suggests the exogeneity of the
23We decompose the interest burden ratio to gauge the evolution of the numerator and the denominator
separately. We nd that the higher interest burden during the crisis is driven by an increase in interest
payments, rather than by a decline in cash ow. Specically, according to our data, the mean value of interest
payments is e115,389 during the crisis period, and e97,681 during the tranquil period. The di¤erence
between these two mean values is statistically signicant at the 1% signicance level (p-value = 0.000).
However, the mean values of cash ow are very similar during and outside of the crisis (e558,825 and
e568,174 respectively), and their di¤erence is not statistically signicant (p-value = 0.479).
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instruments while there is no sign of third-order serial correlation in the error term of the
rst di¤erenced equation.24 As for the Kleibergen-Paap and Cragg-Donald tests, they both
suggest that our model is well identied.25 Overall, the tests show that the instruments are
valid and that there is no sign of mis-specication in the model.
5.2 Non-periphery versus periphery economies during the crisis
Our estimates thus far document the di¤erential role of interest burden in determining rms
employment decisions during and outside of the crisis. In this sub-section we set out to inves-
tigate whether the characterisation of non-periphery/periphery is an important dimension
in the determination of rmsemployment, particularly during extreme economic events. In
Table 2 we present the estimates of Equation (3.3). We document a signicantly di¤erent
response of rmsemployment to interest burden during the crisis period, with respect to
periphery economies. In other words, this nding suggests that rms in the periphery group
react di¤erently to debt-servicing costs during cyclical uctuations. This is a novel result
which documents the impact of the interest burden on rmsemployment during the recent
sovereign debt crisis.
To ascertain the economic importance, we focus on the interaction between the interest
burden, the periphery dummy and the crisis period. The elasticity of employment with
respect to non-crisis years is relatively small at -0.01. Hence, a ten percent rise in the interest
burden decreases rmsworkforce by only 0.10 percent during non-crisis times. However,
the elasticity of employment with respect to interest burden in the crisis period, evaluated
at sample means, is -0.030. Therefore, a ten percent increase in the interest burden reduces
rmsemployment by 0.30 percent during the crisis period. The p-values for the equality of
the coe¢ cients show a statistically signicant di¤erence between the two point estimates.
24As we explain in Sub-section (3.5), the Sargan test tends to over-reject the null in the case of large
samples. Conrming this, when we perform regressions on a selected country-by-country basis (results
available upon request) we obtain larger p-values for the Sargan test.
25The diagnostics on weak instruments using the Cragg and Donald (1993) Wald test are acceptable, when
compared to the reported critical values from Stock and Yogo (2005) for the bias of the instrumental variable
estimates greater than 30 percent of the OLS bias.
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Turning to the remaining interaction terms, the interest burden does not seem to exert
any signicant e¤ect on non-periphery rms during both tranquil and turmoil periods. The
p-value reveals that the coe¢ cients are not statistically di¤erent from each other. Finally,
when comparing the interactions of the interest burden between non-periphery and periphery
groups, during the crisis period, we nd, as expected, that the coe¢ cients are signicantly
higher for the latter group. This nding lends support to our hypothesis that rmslevels of
employment in the periphery group are a¤ected signicantly more during the nancial crisis.
With reference to the remaining control variables, we nd that they remain highly sig-
nicant and behave as conjectured. Moreover, the diagnostics do not indicate any problems
with the specication of the model or the choice of the instruments.
5.3 The role of rm-level heterogeneity
We now explore the extent to which the link between employment and interest burden varies
for di¤erent types of rms during crisis and tranquil times for both periphery and non-
periphery economies, as shown in Equation (3.4). Therefore, comparing across columns in
Table 3 allows us to investigate the specic inuence of each of these dimensions (bank
dependence, size, and privately held vs publicly traded rms) on each of the interactions in
the rows.26
The results bring to the fore an important dimension of rm heterogeneity. We nd that
nancially constrained rms show larger sensitivity with respect to interest burden during
the crisis period.27 This nding suggests that rms, for whom access to external nance is
limited or prohibitively expensive, are more responsive to changes in the debt servicing costs
during adverse economic events.28 In addition, this new result extends the nding of Nickell
26It should be noted that Ireland is dropped from the estimation when we consider the private/public
criterion, hence the smaller number of observations compared to the other measures. This is due to the fact
that public rms in Ireland are dropped after the cleaning process.
27Importantly, we show that the results are robust to the inclusion of rms legal status (privately held vs.
publicly traded) as a measure of rm heterogeneity.
28Our ndings are also related to the literature that shows that capital market imperfections are important
in inuencing rmsreal activities, such as investment, inventory, employment and rm survival (Carpenter
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and Nicolitsas (1999) that the borrowing ratio is more important in determining employment
decisions for rms with high debt compared to rms with lower debt levels. Turning our
attention to the interactions of interest burden for less bank-dependent/large/public rms,
we nd that there is no signicantly di¤erent response. Hence, our results imply that for
less nancially fragile, rms an increase in debt serving costs has no impact on employment
compared to nancially fragile rms, whose employment is signicantly more responsive
during the crisis period.
As a nal test, we consider the role of heterogeneity in rms employment decisions,
distinguishing between non-periphery and periphery economies. The results in Table 4 en-
capsulate an important nding regarding the impact of rm-level heterogeneity. We show
that the di¤erential response of interest burden is stronger for bank dependent/small/private
rms in the periphery area compared to the same group of rms in non-periphery European
economies. As for their counterparts, these remain largely una¤ected, irrespective of loca-
tion.
6 Robustness tests
A series of robustness tests were conducted for the results presented in the previous section.
6.1 Alternative identication strategy
To strengthen our identication, we supplement our detailed rm-level data with bank-rm
relationships in Europe. This data allow us to identify the bank-lending channel at rm level
and to control for credit demand and productivity shocks (Berton et al., 2018).
We rely on Thomson Reuters LPCs Dealscan to extract comprehensive information on
the syndicated loan market. As noted in Acharya et al. (2018), syndicated loans are an
important channel of nancing for European non-nancial rms. As such, we collect in-
and Guariglia, 2008; Guariglia, 2008; Guariglia and Mateut, 2010; Tsoukas, 2011).
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formation on syndicated loans and combine the data with rm-specic information from
Amadeus.29 We end up with a smaller sample compared to the one that we use in our main
regressions, but it is representative of the aggregate EU manufacturing.30
To test for the e¤ect of debt servicing costs on rmsemployment decisions, the following
model is estimated:
nit = 1 + 1Spreadit + 2wit + 3it + 4wit 1 + 5kit + i+
+ (s(i)   t) + (c(i)   t) + (p(i)   t) + it (6.1)
where nit is the change in employment. Spreadit denotes the spreads on loans used
by the banking system for rm i over year t. This is a key variable, which measures the
cost of nancing using the Dealscan variable AllinSpreadDrawn (AISD). It is dened as
the annual spread paid over LIBOR for each euro drawn down from the loan plus facility
fees (see Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Berg et al., 2016). We rely on this interest rate
spread as an alternative debt servicing burden. Following Berton et al. (2018), we measure
the changes in employment and loan spread as X1 X0
0:5X1+0:5X1 , where X0 and X1 correspond
to the values of employment and loan spreads at years t and t-1, respectively. We augment
the model with a number of xed e¤ects in subsequent columns. First, we include rm xed
e¤ects (s(i)) to saturate the model from unobserved timeinvariant rm heterogeneity.
31
Second, to capture di¤erent aggregate demand uctuations in our sample countries and/or in
particular industries within our sample countries, we add interactions between industryyear
(c(i) t) xed e¤ects and countryyear (p(i) t) xed e¤ects. These xed e¤ects are aimed
at removing the possibility of spurious results due to time-varying shocks to an industry in
a given country that may have a¤ected the credit demand of borrowing rms as well as
29As in Acharya et al. (2018), we have to handmatch rms in Amadeus and Dealscan because they do
not share a common identier.
30In untabulated statistics, we show that our sample is reasonably representative of the Amadeus sample
used in the main regressions. We also take care to ensure that our sample is representative of a broader
aggregate.
31We also add rm-level control variables to capture other determinants of rmscorporate policies.
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their employment decisions. Third, we incorporate rm-cluster*time xed e¤ects to absorb
time-varying borrower characteristics and initiatives (or, more broadly, demand shocks) that
might a¤ect rmsemployment decisions (e.g. Jiménez et al., 2012; Jiminez et al., 2014).
Table 5 reports results for di¤erent specications and conrms the previous ndings
regarding the negative e¤ect of the loan spread on employment. We nd that in all models
the cost of borrowing has a highly signicant and economically important e¤ect on the change
in employment at the rm level. The point estimate on Column 3 is -0.053 and implies that
a ten percent increase in the cost of borrowing translates into a 5.3 percent reduction in
employment.
6.2 Additional control variables
We examine whether our main results remain unchanged when we employ an additional
set of rm-specic and country-specic macroeconomic variables to control for rmsoverall
balance sheet position and aggregate demand, respectively. We apply a set of rm-specic
characteristics such as cash ow (calculated as cash ow to capital stock), liquidity (measured
as cash and equivalents to capital stock) and net indebtedness (calculated as the ratio of
liabilities plus long-term debt minus cash and equivalent capital stock). By including these
nancial ratios, we are still able to capture the impact of a change in rm-specic interest rate
and better control for rmsnetworth. More importantly, we can test whether rm-specic
characteristics add any explanatory power to the standard employment equations (see Benito
and Hernando, 2008). Moreover, we enrich our specication with standard empirical proxies
that should capture demand properties of the business cycles using the economic sentiment.
The economic sentiment index is a weighted average of ve sectoral indexes, whose scores
are gathered from surveys stating agentsassessment of the current economic situation and
their expectations about future developments. As such, the sentiment index is used in the
literature as a forward-looking variable capturing growth expectations (Dewachter et al.,
2015; Afonso et al., 2018). This variable is measured at the country-specic level. Results
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in Table 6 conrm that the above modication does not alter our ndings. We nd that the
rm-specic interest burden remains a signicant determinant of employment. Balance sheet
variables (with the exception of liquidity) have no impact on rmsemployment decisions,
whereas the interaction of interest burden with the sentiment variable has a negative and
statistically signicant impact on rm-specic employment.32
6.3 Alternative denition for interest burden
Next, we employ a di¤erent denition of interest burden: the ratio of interest payments to
total debt (implicit interest rate), based on work by Benito and Whitley (2003). In doing
so, we take a three-year moving average of the total debt data, centred on the current year,
and use this as the relevant denominator. Table 7 indicates that during the crisis, the e¤ect
of the implicit interest rate on employment is negative and statistically signicant. Thus,
our results are robust to using an alternative measure of the interest burden.
6.4 Alternative cut-o¤ points
In our baseline results, we use a 50% cut-o¤ point to classify rms as nancially fragile or
less fragile. To ensure that our results are not driven by the way we sort rms, we employ
a di¤erent cut-o¤ point. Specically, we dene as bank-dependent (small) rms whose bank
dependency (total assets) falls in the top (bottom) 75% of the distribution of all rms. The
results in Tables 8 and 9 indicate that the impact of interest burden on employment is
negative and statistically signicant only for more nancially fragile rms operating in the
periphery during the crisis. Thus, our ndings are robust to the use of an alternative cut-o¤
point for the classication of rms.
32We also experiment with additional variables capturing labour market exibility, and our results remain
robust.
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7 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of nancial pressure on employment using a rm-level panel
data-set for the euro area. We nd a signicant negative impact of nancial pressure on
employment. This e¤ect is stronger for rms in the periphery of the euro area during the
crisis. Within the periphery group, we nd that the sensitivity of employment to nancial
pressure is stronger for nancially fragile rms and SMEs. Our results are robust to a several
sensitivity checks. Our ndings have important policy implications. They suggest that policy
initiatives aimed at enhancing credit availability and relaxing the nancial constraints faced
by smaller rms in the periphery, are essential to support the economic recovery of the euro
area.
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Table 1: Employment, nancial pressure and the crisis
Baseline Crisis
(1) (2)
nit 1 0.990*** 0.929***
(104.99) (20.33)
IBit 1 -0.146**
(-2.41)
IBit 1Crisist -0.179**
(-2.45)
IBit 1(1-Crisist) 0.188
(0.96)
wit -1.372*** -1.450***
(-10.48) (-5.89)
it 0.791*** 0.778***
(8.50) (4.54)
wit 1 -0.133*** -0.059
(-2.97) (-1.00)
kit 0.019*** 0.059*
(2.86) (1.71)
Observations 399,948 399,948
Firms 94,395 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.686 0.105
Di¤erence-Sargan (p-value) 0.057 0.332
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m2(p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.726 0.618
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (level) 0.052 0.021
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (Di¤) 0.033 0.056
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) level 43.234 82.32
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) Di¤ 8.940 5.720
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.020
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Crisis is 2010-11. The gures in parentheses report
t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted
with industry dummies are included. We instrument IB with the euro area monetary policy shock. Instruments include all other
regressors lagged three times or more. The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square
under the null of instrument validity. Di¤erence-Sargan is a Sargan test of the validity of the additional moment conditions
associated with the level equations. Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Kleibergen-Paap LM is a test of under-identication, distributed
as chi-square under the null of under-identication. The Cragg-Donald Wald statistic is a weak-instrument test distributed as
F-test, under the null of weak instruments with assumption of identically and independently distributed errors (i.i.d.). *, **,
and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2: Periphery, non-periphery and the crisis
nit 1 0.970***
(57.87)
IBit 1CrisistPeripheryi -0.224***
(-3.57)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)Peripheryi -0.088
(-1.13)
IBit 1Crisist(1-Peripheryi) 0.235
(0.85)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)(1-Peripheryi) 0.106
(0.37)
wit -1.420***
(-8.26)
it 0.907***
(7.85)
wit 1 -0.192***
(-4.25)
kit 0.017**
(2.29)
Observations 399,948
Firms 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.060
Di¤erence-Sargan (p-value) 0.082
m1 (p-value) 0.000
m2 (p-value) 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.576
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (level) 0.062
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (Di¤) 0.048
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) level 33.761
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) Di¤ 6.731
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis periph. vs. non-crisis periph. 0.069
IB crisis non-periph. vs. non-crisis non-periph. 0.442
IB non-crisis periph. vs. non-crisis non-periph. 0.548
IB crisis periph. vs. crisis non-periph. 0.084
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Crisis is 2010-11. Periphery is a dummy equal to
one if the rm is operating in periphery economies, and zero otherwise. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry
dummies are included. We instrument IB with the euro area monetary policy shock. Instruments include all other regressors
lagged three times or more. The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under
the null of instrument validity. Di¤erence-Sargan is a Sargan test of the validity of the additional moment conditions associated
with the level equations. Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Kleibergen-Paap LM is a test of under-identication, distributed as
chi-square under the null of under-identication. The Cragg-Donald Wald statistic is a weak-instrument test distributed as
F-test, under the null of weak instruments with assumption of identically and independently distributed errors (i.i.d.). *, **,
and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Firm-level heterogeneity and the crisis
Dummy= Dummy= Dummy=
BankDep Size Private
(1) (2) (3)
nit 1 0.872*** 0.913*** 0.934***
(14.38) (25.55) (41.70)
IBit 1CrisistDummyit -0.263*** -0.426*** -0.306***
(-2.59) (-3.57) (-3.51)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)Dummyit 0.027 -0.308*** -0.160
(0.21) (-3.63) (-1.62)
IBit 1Crisist(1-Dummyit) -0.029 0.006 -0.068
(-0.37) (0.06) (-0.50)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)(1-Dummyit) -0.063 0.017 0.198
(-0.047) (0.31) (1.35)
wit -1.347*** -1.100*** -0.895***
(-6.28) (-7.58) (-5.59)
it 0.594*** 0.437*** 0.549***
(3.42) (2.95) (8.68)
wit 1 -0.095* -0.107*** -0.128**
(-1.72) (-2.98) (-2.30)
kit 0.090** 0.014 0.036***
(2.02) (0.96) (7.13)
Observations 399,948 399,948 321,294
Firms 94,395 94,395 74,010
Sargan (p-value) 0.575 0.011 0.019
Di¤erence-Sargan (p-value) 0.143 0.054 0.051
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.012
m2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.703
m3 (p-value) 0.548 0.604 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (level) 0.047 0.063 0.041
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (Di¤) 0.100 0.089 0.102
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) level 22.032 19.021 30.289
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) Di¤ 10.035 8.302 7.033
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis Dummy vs. non-crisis Dummy 0.008 0.005 0.051
IB crisis 1-Dummy. vs. non-crisis 1-Dummy 0.823 0.829 0.052
IB non-crisis Dummy. vs. non-crisis 1-Dummy 0.652 0.004 0.019
IB crisis Dummy. vs. crisis 1-Dummy 0.057 0.014 0.099
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Crisis is 2010-11. Periphery is a dummy equal to one if
the rm is operating in periphery economies, and zero otherwise. The variable Dummy indicates in turn Bank-dependent, small
and private rms. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country,
industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. We instrument IB with the euro
area monetary policy shock. Instruments include all other regressors lagged three (two) times or more in column 1 and 2 (3).
The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity.
Di¤erence-Sargan is a Sargan test of the validity of the additional moment conditions associated with the level equations. Mj
is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of
no serial correlation. The Kleibergen-Paap LM is a test of under-identication, distributed as chi-square under the null of
under-identication. The Cragg-Donald Wald statistic is a weak-instrument test distributed as F-test, under the null of weak
instruments with assumption of identically and independently distributed errors (i.i.d.). *, **, and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Alternative identication strategy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spreadit -0.065*** -0.071*** -0.053*** -0.027***
(-13.04) (-14.11) (-3.06) (-4.83)
wit -0.375***
(-9.96)
it 0.150***
(10.56)
wit 1 -0.294***
(-2.82)
kit 0.046***
(5.76)
Observations 2,518 2,518 2,518 1,796
Firms 103 103 103 88
R-squared 0.500 0.335 0.503 0.714
Firm xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*year xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country xed e¤ects Yes No No No
Country*year xed e¤ects No Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster* year xed e¤ects No No Yes Yes
Notes: All specications are estimated using OLS. The dependent variable is the change in employment. Spread measures the
cost of nancing using the DealScan variable AllinSpreadDrawn (AISD). The gures in parentheses report robust t-statistics.
The standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
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Table 6: Additional control variables
Cow Liq Netdebt Sentiment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nit 1 0.968*** 0.970*** 0.962*** 0.850***
(78.50) (96.05) (96.72) (18.43)
IBit 1 -0.091* -0.128*** -0.092* -0.492**
(-1.95) (-2.66) (-1.67) (-2.11)
Cowit 1 0.022
(0.94)
Liqit 1 0.010*
(1.73)
Netdebtit 1 0.521
(0.45)
IBt 1Sentt 0.053***
(3.22)
wit -1.128*** -1.128*** -1.051*** -1.113***
(-9.78) (-9.65) (-5.38) (-6.29)
it 0.784*** 0.769*** 0.767*** 0.453***
(8.03) (8.00) (6.56) (4.52)
wit 1 -0.117*** -0.154*** -0.106** -0.272***
(-3.25) (-3.87) (-2.17) (-3.51)
kit 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.022* 0.132***
(2.67) (3.78) (1.83) (3.16)
Observations 372,109 367,345 305,761 373,651
Firms 90,786 90,631 81,461 91,037
Sargan (p-value) 0.023 0.058 0.005 0.027
Di¤erence-Sargan (p-value) 0.015 0.037 0.010 0.049
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.572
m3 (p-value) 0.402 0.668 0.181 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (level) 0.021 0.012 0.009 0.025
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (Di¤) 0.106 0.008 0.010 0.045
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) level 20.602 10.023 23.022 56.231
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) Di¤ 6.036 5.082 10.023 28.320
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Cow is the ratio of cash ow to capital stock. Liq is
cash and equivalents to capital stock. Netdebt is the ratio of liabilities plus long-term debt minus cash and equivalent to capital
stock. Sent is a weighted average of ve sectoral indexes, whose scores are gathered from surveys stating agentsassessment of
the current economic situation and their expectations about future development. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics
that are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included. We instrument IB with the euro area monetary policy shock. Instruments include all other
regressors lagged three times or more (column 1 to column 3) and two times or more (column 4). The Sargan statistic is a
test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Di¤erence-Sargan is a
Sargan test of the validity of the additional moment conditions associated with the level equations. Mj is a test of jth-order
serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.
The Kleibergen-Paap LM is a test of under-identication, distributed as chi-square under the null of under-identication. The
Cragg-Donald Wald statistic is a weak-instrument test distributed as F-test, under the null of weak instruments with assumption
of identically and independently distributed errors (i.i.d.). *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Alternative denition of interest burden
Baseline Crisis
(1) (2)
nit 1 0.965*** 0.978***
(77.85) (73.88)
IBdit 1 -0.015*
(-1.89)
IBdit 1Crisist -0.064**
(-2.51)
IBdit 1(1-Crisist) -0.011
(-0.042)
wit -1.130*** -0.743***
(-6.88) (-4.49)
it 0.961*** 0.113
(4.70) (0.50)
wit 1 0.036 -0.005
(1.17) (-0.16)
kit 0.006 -0.004
(0.72) (-0.62)
Observations 363,932 363,932
Firms 86,636 86,636
Sargan (p-value) 0.032 0.117
Di¤erence-Sargan (p-value) 0.010 0.052
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.252 0.516
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (level) 0.018 0.085
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (Di¤) 0.102 0.098
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) level 18.032 17.033
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) Di¤ 8.032 6.025
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis vs. non-crisis 0.011
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Crisis is 2010-11. IB is is dened as the ratio of interest
payments to a three-year moving average of total debt. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically
robust to heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are
included. We instrument IB with the euro area monetary policy shock. Instruments include all other regressors lagged three
times or more. The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of
instrument validity. Di¤erence-Sargan is a Sargan test of the validity of the additional moment conditions associated with the
level equations. Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1)
under the null of no serial correlation. The Kleibergen-Paap LM is a test of under-identication, distributed as chi-square under
the null of under-identication. The Cragg-Donald Wald statistic is a weak-instrument test distributed as F-test, under the
null of weak instruments with assumption of identically and independently distributed errors (i.i.d.). *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 8: Alternative classication for rm-level heterogeneity
Dummy= Dummy=
BankDep Size
(1) (2)
nit 1 0.968*** 0.962***
(32.88) (55.33)
IBit 1CrisistDummyit -0.160*** -0.165***
(-2.87) (-3.07)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)Dummyit 0.042 -0.085**
(0.60) (-2.24)
IBit 1Crisist(1-Dummyit) 0.181 0.030
(1.05) (0.37)
IBit 1(1-Crisist)(1-Dummyit) 0.225 0.031
(1.35) (0.79)
wit -1.124*** -1.008***
(-8.40) (-8.00)
it 0.690*** 0.576***
(9.08) (4.66)
wit 1 -0.105 -0.119***
(-1.53) (-4.40)
kit 0.003 0.009*
(0.26) (1.79)
Observations 399,948 399,948
Firms 94,395 94,395
Sargan (p-value) 0.019 0.006
Di¤erence-Sargan (p-value) 0.102 0.053
m1 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000
m3 (p-value) 0.691 0.924
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (level) 0.012 0.053
Kleibergen-Paap LM Test (Di¤) 20.052 0.012
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) level 9.052 40.023
Cragg-Donald (F statistic) Di¤ 6.023 6.021
F-test of equality (p-value)
IB crisis Dummy vs. non-crisis Dummy 0.003 0.027
IB crisis 1-Dummy. vs. non-crisis 1-Dummy 0.475 0.989
IB non-crisis Dummy. vs. non-crisis 1-Dummy 0.338 0.012
IB crisis Dummy. vs. crisis 1-Dummy 0.048 0.050
Notes: All specications are estimated using a system GMM estimator. Crisis is 2010-11. Periphery is a dummy equal to one
if the rm is operating in periphery economies, and zero otherwise. The variable Dummy indicates in turn Bank-dependent
and small rms. Classication is based on bank dependence (size) at the top (bottom) 75% of the distribution of all rms
operating in the same industry at a given year. The gures in parentheses report t-statistics that are asymptotically robust to
heteroskedasticity. Country, industry, time dummies, and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are included. We
instrument IB with the euro area monetary policy shock. Instruments include all other regressors lagged three times or more.
The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity.
Di¤erence-Sargan is a Sargan test of the validity of the additional moment conditions associated with the level equations. Mj
is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of
no serial correlation. The Kleibergen-Paap LM is a test of under-identication, distributed as chi-square under the null of
under-identication. The Cragg-Donald Wald statistic is a weak-instrument test distributed as F-test, under the null of weak
instruments with assumption of identically and independently distributed errors (i.i.d.). *, **, and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Figure 1: This gure presents the average interest rate on new loans below 1 million euro to non-nancial corporations over
the period 2003-2011 across a sample of euro area countries, separating periphery (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) from
non-periphery economies (Austria , Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands).
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Figure 2: This gure presents the average standardised (z-score) level of loans to non-nancial corporations over the period
2003-2011 across a sample of euro area countries, separating periphery (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) from non-periphery
economies (Austria , Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands).
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